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Abstract. The penetration of PKI technology in the market is moving
slowly due to interoperability concerns. Main causes are not technical
but political and social since there is no trust development model that
appropriately deals with multidomain PKIs. We propose a new archi-
tecture that on one hand considers that trust is not an homogeneous
property but tied to a particular relation, and on the other hand, trust
management must be performed through specialized entities that can
evaluate its risks and threads. The model is based on trust certificate
lists that allows users to hold a personalized trust view without having
to get involved in technical details. The model dynamically adapts to
the context changes thanks to a new certificate extension, we have called
TrustProviderLink (TPL).
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1 Introduction
PKI technology has been widely accepted as the best solution to provide secure
electronic transactions through an insecure channel. However, its global market
penetration to common applications of general use it is not yet a fact.
The key reason for the slow adoption of PKI solutions in mass media prod-
ucts [1, 2] is due to interoperability concerns. Interoperability can not be simply
characterized as a technology-only issue. In fact, it encompasses a wide range of
technical, legal and political issues.
The PKI industry has addressed technical interoperability problems through
a standardization process of data types and protocols. Nowadays, despite the
flexibility of the specifications, PKI technology has achieved maturity and the
basic interoperability goals between different vendor solutions are guaranteed.
Therefore, today’s major drawback for the PKI adoption is the difficulty
to deploy a cross-border solution due to differences in the countries legal and
political framework. Governments are reluctant to recognize other nation’s CAs
if they do not take part in the quality control and, on the other hand, the scope
of liabilities of a CA is not clear if the jurisdiction does not regulate it by law.
Several proposals have been presented to overcome these problems such as cross-
certification and Bridge Certification Authority. Yet, none of them has succeed
2because of the complexities involved in the management of such infrastructures
and the generalist perspective in which they are based.
The contribution of this paper is defining a procedure to facilitate the inte-
gration and interoperability of different PKI islands. The aim is being able to
deal with elements of external security domains without creating a unique and
monolithic infrastructure that is unable to adapt to any change. Users are the
last responsible entities of the trust assignment within their context. Facilities
are provided to identify the scope and attributions of each authority so that end
entities can easily take the more appropriate decision for themselves.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the main trust
models and their challenges are reviewed. Section 3 presents the proposed archi-
tecture and describes the entities and elements involved. In Section 4 we specify
the functionality of the proposed architecture. Finally, section 5 concludes the
paper and outlines some ideas for future research.
2 Trust models and challenges
PKI is intended to establish and maintain trusted relationships. In order to
reach such objectives, mechanisms to propagate trust from credited organisms
to unknown entities have to be built. See in [3] a survey on interoperability issues
of multi-domain PKI. Next, we review the main trust model proposals and we
identify their most relevant challenges.
2.1 Trust models
Single CA
PKI trust development has been studied and analyzed from PKI origins.
The most simple topology architecture is the single Certification Authority (CA)
model, that is, all certificates are issued by a unique CA. Although simple, this
design neither scales well nor adapts to the society patterns, so it leads to the
appearance of multiple interconnected CAs which manage communities of users
that can not interoperate ones with the others.
Hierarchical PKI
The first attempt to solve the problem of having multiple interconnected
trust islands was the hierarchical PKI structure that is managed by a Root
Certification Authority (RCA). Trust is established in a tree-like fashion and
flows from top to bottom. The RCA public key is the fundamental point of
trust, or trust anchor, for evaluating certificate acceptability. In this model the
path construction procedure is very simple, as a single path exists from any end
entity up to the RCA.
However, deploying a global unique RCA is inappropriate for political rea-
sons. There is not a consensus about whom it would manage the RCA and how
it would do it. Thus the conclusion is that this model is only directly applicable
within one domain, which is generally supported in one or several communities
3generally forming different security domains, but always within one unique ad-
ministrative domain.
Mesh PKI
There has been multiple efforts to bring trust development to inter-domain
levels. In the cross-certification model, also known as mesh model, two CAs
cross-certify each other once they agree to trust and rely on each other’s issued
public key certificates as if they had generated them themselves. Pairs of CAs
exchange cross-certificates and enable users from one administrative domain to
interact electronically and securely with users from the other.
However, the number of cross-certificates tends to grow exponentially with
the number of CAs and policy mappings are very complex. Therefore, there
appear scalability problems.
On the other hand, if a PKI domain A wants to join another PKI domain B
but restrict or deny trust in one or more other domains that B may have joined,
A has to issue a cross-certificate to B where policy constraints shall be explicitly
included. This makes the building of certification paths between two generic end
entities still more unmanageable.
Mesh model can be also build upon a hierarchical PKI architecture so that
the number of required cross-certificates can be reduced and the complexity of
the system lightened. Although IETF has included CA cross-certification in its
Certificate Management Protocol [4] and there are some implementations of it,
cross-certification is still not well supported by common general-purpose appli-
cations like browsers or email clients.
Trust Lists
There is not an homogenous way to define or formalize trust lists. While for
ones is just a list of certificates (i.e. stores of certificates used in web browsers), for
others is a signed list that can contain any trusted information and, in particular,
certificates; this is the case of the Certificate Trust List (CTL) format from
Microsoft.
In this paper we use the term trust list to designate a signed set of trusted
certificates plus information defining properties and constraints on how to apply
this trust [5].
There are two types of trust lists:
– User trust lists: managed by a single user.
– Provider trust lists: managed by a trust provider.
The user trust list model is the most common trust development architecture
in use today, offered by operating systems and web applications. An example is
the list of more than a hundred CAs included in distributions of Microsoft OS.
The requirement to appear in this list is paying a fee to Microsoft. On the other
hand, end users can modify this list by adding or deleting CAs as needed.
User trust list model does not present technical complexities. However, it
has to be noticed that users do not have the means or skills to construct their
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evaluate the risks that entails accepting them. This is, for example, the case
of web browser applications, that are distributed with a predefined trust list
attached to them so that users do not have to create it.
On the other hand, provider trust lists are created and managed by trust
providers (TP). Its aim is to serve as a reference for users; the trust on the
certificates of the list is recommended by a TP. From an inter-domain interoper-
ability perspective, the provider trust list essentially replaces the cross-certificate
pair in the Mesh model. The user trusts the issuer of the list, adopts the list,
and then the trust is extended to the CAs conveyed within it.
Bridge CA
Bridge CA (BCA) trust model was first introduced by the U.S. Federal Gov-
ernment [6] as a way to facilitate the interconnection of CAs through a cross-
certification process. Each user only trusts its own CA which in turn trusts the
bridge that finally trusts the remote CA, so that each member needs only to
maintain a single cross-certification with the BCA and then it is automatically
able to build certification paths across all spokes.
It must be noted that the BCA is not intended to be used as a trust anchor by
the users of the PKI. It simply acts as a gateway between isolated CAs. Even so,
BCA is responsible to map certificate policies and guarantee PKI equivalences
adequately. Therefore, users must rely on it regarding these mappings.
Although this model is quite simple from the end user perspective, in fact
it presents technical difficulties because the path construction is intrinsically
complex and several checks (e.g. policy and name constraints, certificate status,
policy mappings) must be performed throughout the certificate chain. Nowadays,
the Federal BCA is trying to interconnect with other BCAs, but it is reporting
both technical and operational problems (see Top 10 issues from [7]).
European Community took a project for deploying a BCA for the member
states. In a way to facilitate the interoperability, their proposal [8] was to create
an hybrid BCA that combines the distribution of accredited CA certificates
under the form of a signed list, and the cross-certification of the CA with the
BCA for those users that do not want to download trust lists.
The European BCA pilot finished in 2004. They concluded [5] cross-certifi-
cation was more tedious than trust lists and that the model should be restricted
to the use of these last ones.
Bridge VA
The Bridge Validation Authority (BVA) trust model [9, 10] is a further step to
the BCA in which the central entity is not a CA but a Validation Authority (VA).
VAs are trusted third parties that offer online services on certificate validation. In
general terms, they are responsible of building the certification path, evaluating
the quality of the certificates, validating their status, and ensuring they are
5In the BVA model, the element that links multiple PKI islands is an VA that
gathers and classifies status information of certificates from multiple domains.
BVA becomes the trust anchor for users and admits liabilities for the certificates
it works with.
This model solves some of the technical complexities of BCA, for instance,
when dealing with path construction, and offers to the users a more comfort-
able service. Although simple, users are totally relegated to the decisions of the
BVA and do not receive any information about the characteristics, quality or
application context associated to the CA they are working with.
On the other hand, as we have already seen in other models, it can not exist
a unique BVA in the world due to political reasons, but multiple instances of
them. Whether users trust one or more BVA, and how they combine the results
stated by each authority has to be solved for each user.
2.2 Trust Development Challenges
As we have described above, several solutions for building trust have been pro-
posed, however, trust development still presents challenges. In the following use
case, we expose the common problems users face up when dealing with security
services.
Lets suppose a user, Bob, who has traveled to a foreign country and is visiting
the city. While he is walking in the park, he sees a publicity announcing a music
show that night in the theater. He wants to buy a ticket, so he gets his PDA
an tries to connect to a wifi network. He finds an ad hoc network that reaches
Internet and makes a request for establishing a connection.
Charles is another member of the ad hoc network. He is Bob’s neighbor and
can provide him with forwarding services so that Bob can connect to the theater.
However, Charles would not forward Bob’s packets unless he can assure Bob is
not a selfish user of ad hoc networks, and that he will be rewarded afterward
through a reputation system. Therefore, he wants to verify Bob’s identity and
that he is registered to a CA that takes liabilities in case of problems.
Charles verifies the signature of Bob’s certificate and checks all data is correct.
However Charles is unable to verify the certification chain of Bob up to a root
CA because he does not know that authority and does not trust it. If Charles’
CA has not a binding relationship with Bob’s PKI domain, he has no further
means to obtain relevant information for extending trust to Bob.
In this example case, let’s suppose Charles takes the risk of giving forwarding
services to Bob. Now, Bob can reach the Internet and tries to buy theater tickets.
He can successfully build the vendor’s certification path and validate the certi-
fication chain is correct. Still, he does not have any information on the quality
of the certificate and if it is appropriate for using it in e-commerce applications.
Bob does not want taking the risk of buying the tickets in a foreign country to
a vendor that uses a certificate that is not qualified, so pitifully, he will not be
able to go to the theater.
The example presented above shows that the challenges of trust models based
on PKI can be summarized in:
6– Processing certification paths, that is, finding an ordered sequence of certifi-
cates from the end entity certificate to a trust anchor.
– Determining the quality of the certificate, which can be usually derived from
the certificate policy.
– Deciding if the certificate is trustworthy for the purpose at hand.
Some models like BVA and Trust Lists have a simple certification path man-
agement, however, they do not offer users details about quality of service pa-
rameters. If a CA issues two types of certificates with different security policies,
the BVA party will extend the same type of responses for the two of them, with-
out including quality information that can be used by the user as a qualifying
parameter for the trust decision.
BCA model offers some quality of service through cross-certification policies.
The BCA is responsible for certification mapping and it has to publish the rules
that follows to accept new CAs. However, such architecture presents technical
complexities that can harden interoperability.
Several proposals have emerged to formalize a certification policy format [11,
12] and define a way to interpret the CA liabilities and the quality of the certifi-
cates it issues. In [13] authors define an automatic way to compare certificates
from different CAs and determine its relative quality. The use of standard de-
scription rules will facilitate certificate evaluation. However, users neither have
the knowledge nor the capacity to interpret all the parameters and take a deci-
sion about the quality of the certificate. So, they have to delegate this operation
in some external entities, which we call Trust Providers (TP).
Another challenge of PKI trust models is how to extend trust and decide if
a certificate is trustworthy for the purpose at hand. In spite of some technical
complexities, the main problem of existing trust models is that they do not follow
the trust building guidelines we use in personal relationships.
Setting up a global uniform network of trust is not viable. The models pro-
posed so far that admit some personalization are the ones based on trust lists.
However, current trust lists implementations are very simple and only cover cer-
tificate’s classification in a few categories: trusted CA certificates, web server
certificates, code validation certificates and end user certificates.
3 Architecture description
In this section we describe the architecture of our trust model aimed to facilitate
the multidomain PKI interoperability. The main characteristics of the proposed
architecture are:
– Built upon a centralized PKI model that extends trust from well know au-
thorities in which users trust, the TP.
– Let users configure its own trust list based on recommendations, that can
be accepted or not.
– Facilitate trust list dissemination and management using core PKI mecha-
nisms.
7Different entities interoperate in our architecture using different elements (see
figure 1).
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3.1 Architecture entities
The main architecture entities of our model are users, Certification Authorities
(CA) and Trust Providers (TP).
In our architecture we use the term user in a wider sense. A user is the one
that has a certificate but also the entity that wants to validate a certificate. No-
tice that the latter does not need to have a certificate, and in some environments
entities that validate certificates are called relying parties [14]. However we use
the term user in both cases in order to simplify the description.
Certification Authorities (CA) are entities that issue certificates and
vouch for the binding between the data items in these certificates. CAs manage
the whole life cycle of certificates, revoking them if they are compromised before
the validity period, renewing if the validity has to be extended, and publishing
updated status information so that users can be accurately informed. Root Cer-
tification Authorities (RCA) are a special case of CA with a top hierarchical
level.
Trust Providers (TP) are well known entities that have accredited po-
litical, legal or social impact (i.e. the Ministry of Law or recognized private
enterprise). They manage lists of CA certificates that they consider reliable and
that have the required quality for being used in some specific actions. The ap-
8plication context of the certificates in the list is confined to the influence scope
of the Trust Provider.
3.2 Architecture main elements
Our architecture main elements are certificates, list of trust providers, trust lists,
and a trust list enforcement engine.
Certificates
Certificates are the central point of any PKI based model. Our architecture
uses X.509 certificates [15] in which a new certificate extension called Trust
Provider Link (TPL) has been included.
The TPL is a noncritical certificate extension that contains URL locations
where a list of trust providers can be retrieved. The TPL extension shall be
identified by a unique object identifier:
id-pe-trustProvidersLink OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 20 }
The ASN.1 specification of the extension is the following:
trustProvidersLink ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
TrustProviderLink
trustProviderLink ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
trustProvidersLink is a list of trustProviderLink objects that contain
the location where the CA that issued the certificate publishes the list of TP.
List of trust providers
A list of trust providers is the relation of different TP that support the CA
policy. Such list is formatted in XML and includes a brief description of the TP
included. Table 1 shows the elements of the list in XPath language [16].
Notice that lists of trust providers are signed to avoid fake manipulations in
the data. A specific example of a list of providers is shown in figure 2.
Trust lists
The main element of our architecture are trust lists. Two different trust lists
can be identified: user trust lists and provider trust lists, which are managed by
TPs so that they are also known as TP trust lists.
Trust lists contains three groups of information:
– List owner data: It identifies the entity responsible of the trust list. In case
such entity is a TP the list is more reliable and it includes the services offered
by the TP, the number of clients that it has, the purpose of the list and its
target. It also states if the TP is refining an existing trust list, or it creates
it from scratch.
9Table 1. List of trust providers parameters
XPath Value
/List List container
/List/TrustProvider[n] Information of a n’th Trust Provider (TP)
of the list
/List/TrustProvider[n]/Name TP’s distinguished name
/List/TrustProvider[n]/Context The operational context of the TP, i.e, pub-
lic administrations, e-commerce, ..
/List/TrustProvider[n]/Scope TP’s influence ambit. It can be global (i.e.
Microsoft) or local (trust list of a European
member state)
/List/TrustProvider[n]/CertProvider TP’s certification provider, in case it exists
/List/TrustProvider[n]/Reference URL location of the trust lists
/List/ds:Signature XML Signature of the whole list
Fig. 2. List of trust providers example
– Certificate list: List of trusted certificates and qualifying information.
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– Authenticity data: It includes parameters to validate the integrity and au-
thenticity of the data contained in the list. Such parameters include a hash
of the data, a signature and the signing certificate.
We introduce a format of trust lists that allows defining quality parameters
for the certificates. Table 2 shows the elements of the list in XPath language. The
format of the list is based on the ETSI specification [17] that has been extended
to include certificates data.
Table 2. Trust lists parameters
XPath Value
/TrustList Trust List (TL) container
/TrustList/ThisUpdate Publication date
/TrustList/Target Public target
/TrustList/Purpose Purpose
/TrustList/From List of Trust Providers (TP) that have con-
tributed to the creation of the present TL
/TrustList/From/TrustProvider[n] Information of a n’th TP
/TrustList/From/
TrustProvider[n]/Id
Distinguished Name
/TrustList/From/
TrustProvider[n]/Update
Publication date of the provider’s list
/TrustList/Owner Information of the responsible of the TL
/TrustList/Owner/Id Distinguished Name
/TrustList/Owner/Name Name of the responsible legal entity
/TrustList/Owner/Address Postal address
/TrustList/Owner/URI Web address
/TrustList/Owner/Services List of services provided by the entity
/TrustList/Owner/BeginDate Legal entity creation date
/TrustList/Owner/Context The operational context of the owner, i.e, pub-
lic administrations, e-commerce, ..
/TrustList/Owner/Market Market of the owner
/TrustList/Owner/Status Financial range of the owner
/TrustList/CertList List of trusted certificates
/TrustList/CertList/CA[n] Information of a n’th CA. This element in-
cludes trust parameters in semantic languages
/TrustList/CertList/
CA[n]/CertProperties
Encoded certificate and certificate fields
/TrustList/CertList/
CA[n]Constraints
Information to qualify the certificate
/TrustList/ds:Signature XML Signature of the whole list
TP evaluate certificates they want to include in their trust list based on their
knowledge of the CA holder and the quality of the issued certificates (that is,
the CA certificate policy). Results from the evaluation are expressed on the list
using an ontology language [18]. Ontology languages are formal languages used
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to construct ontologies, that is, specifications of some concepts. They allow the
encoding of knowledge about specific domains and often include reasoning rules
that support the processing of that knowledge.
We use ontologies to include any properties and constraints for the certificates
issued by the CAs in the list. Categorization of certificates is achieved with
information of two orthogonal fields (see figure 3):
– Service: the security services that shall be granted, like identification, data
authentication, access control, non-repudiation or establishment of a confi-
dential channel.
– Sector: the ambit of the target application, i.e., government, pharmaceuti-
cal, banking, transport, leisure, etc.
Finally, TP define a certificate Trust Level for using the stated certificates in
each specific environment.
Trust List
CA
Service Sector
has member
provides
security in
application
context
Trust Level
Is confidentIs confident
Refinements
Has
refinements
Confidence
level
Fig. 3. Trust list ontology schema
Ontologies provide means to define relations between the objects in a domain.
This information is exploited in trust lists as a way to automatically propagate
trust on certificates used in similar environments. For example, a TP may recom-
mend a certificate to be accepted for non-repudiation services in governmental
applications. By extension, if a user asks if he shall accept this certificate for
authentication purposes in an e-administration environment, the response will
be true.
Extending the context of use of a certificate entails some risks, for this reason,
the confidence level of this kind of recommendations will always be lower than the
primary goals for it was intended. The client application is responsible to define
a threshold above which certificates will be accepted, and rejected otherwise.
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Fig. 4. Trust list example
Figure 4 shows an example of a TP trust list. The TP is a medical enterprise
that offers health services and insurances. It has defined a trust list of certificates
to be used in social services. In particular, the example depicts a CA that can
be used for non repudiation operations in an e-health context.
Trust list enforcement engine
Since there are many independent PKI domains in the world and new ones
are appearing every day, user trust lists have to be updated regularly to meet the
changes. New methods have to be provided in order to modify and include the
appropriate CAs in the list and trust list enforcement engines are the appropriate
tool.
Trust lists are tied with trust list enforcement engines, that are used to encode
users requirements and check if certificates fulfill the stated rules according to the
list. The engine is the interface of trust lists that can interpret users requirements
in natural language and automatize the process of list modification and update.
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4 Architecture function
4.1 User trust list creation
Users trust lists are initially created importing the information from a provider
trust list of an entity whom the user knows and trusts. Therefore, users construct
they own trust list based on TP recommendations, that are formalized in an TP
trust list.
TP can offer a downloading interface that allows exporting only some parts
of the list (some selected CAs). Anyway, the information users accept from the
provider trust lists, can be then refined and modified.
4.2 User trust list management
Trust providers value and classify certificates in the lists they publish. Users can
refine or modify this classification in the lists managed by themselves. When a
user imports new providers trust lists to his own list, the trust list enforcement
engine merges the data with the contents of the other providers.
In our model, the use of user trust lists is not mandatory. There is a way to
fasten the trust validation of a certificate and guarantee the service is available
anytime. However, users that need to check a certificate and are not using their
personal device nor having access to their trust list, can perform the validation
directly. The trust list enforcement engine directs the user to the list of TP
referenced in the certificate under validation, the user will have to indicate if he
trusts any of the TP on the list and, if positive, the trust list of the selected TP
will be checked and its recommendations imported.
4.3 Certificate evaluation
In the general model, users maintain a trust list that contains the PKI domains
they trust. When they are involved in an electronic transaction and need to de-
cide the acceptance of a certificate, they delegate to the trust list enforcement
engine the certification path construction and the evaluation of whether the cer-
tificate is sufficiently trusted and qualified for that specific purpose. The inputs
to the engine are the certificate itself, and a description of the context in use.
For example, a user can request if a certificate is admissible for non-repudiation
purposes in a work contract.
Certificate evaluation can be directly requested from the client application
itself (mail client, web browser, document reader, ...). In this case, the client
application is the one that passes contextual inputs to the trust list enforcement
engine.
Figure 1 shows the certificate evaluation steps:
Step 1 The enforcement engine tries to build a trust certification path from the
user certificate to a trust CA in the list. If it is unable to do it, it can be
because it does not know that authority, or because it does know it but the
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user does not explicitly trust in it. In the first case, as the certificate under
evaluation holds a TPL extension, the engine can obtain more information
about the PKI domain where the certificate belongs through the recom-
mendations made by some TPs. The TPL extension points to a list of TPs
that can supply more information about the unrecognized certification chain.
Step 2 The enforcement engine connects to the web page in which the CA that
issued the certificate publishes a list of TPs. All TPs in the list support the
CA, however, the context and scope of each provider is different. If the list of
TPs is not available, the certificate under evaluation is considered untrustful
and the process is finished.
Otherwise, after getting the list of TPs and verifying that is authentic and
has not been manipulated, the engine searches if the user knows some of the
providers, that is, checks if TPs are registered in the user trust list. If this is
the case, the recommendation of the registered TPs is accepted. Otherwise,
the engine asks the user if he want to import some new TP in the repository
and acts accordingly.
Step 3 TPs are reached. The client verifies the signature of the TP trust lists.
Step 4 TPs trust lists are downloaded and merged with the current information
in the user trust list. When recommendations on a PKI domain come from
several trust providers, the best trust level values are the ones that prevail.
If information of trust providers has to be merged with data stated by the
user owning the list, the user opinion takes preference.
Finally, we review the use case example we have introduced in section 2.2 to
explain how it can be resolved using our trust list model. Users Bob and Charles
are connected in an ad hoc network. Bob requests Charles forwarding access
through his node so that he can reach Internet. Charles is not able to construct
Bob’s certification chain and he does not trust the authority. As Bob’s certificate
holds a TPL extension, he can get information about the TP that recommend
the acceptance of the certificate.
Charles recognizes some of the TP on the list. TP are reached in order,
starting by the provider that best meets the requirements of the situation, and
ending with the remotest one. For each provider that recommends the use of the
certificate, the client application alerts the user and asks for a confirmation.
In our particular case, Charles seeks confidence parameters in the context
of ad hoc networks, and particularly in the access control operation. TP that
support Bob certification chain are unknown to Charles, and are in the public
administration domain. However, because the number of known TP that recom-
mend the use of the certificate is very high, and because the risk of the operation
is low, Charles accepts the identity of Bob and grants him the access.
So far, Bob can browse the Internet. He connects to the theater for buying the
ticket. However, the vendor presents him a certificate that he does not recognize
because does not maintain a user trust list in his handheld device due to its
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limited capacity. He asks the trust list enforcement engine to verify the validity
of the certificate for e-commerce services.
The engine verifies that the vendor certificate is issued by a CA that is
member of the certificate trust lists of the major software vendors, and that the
context of this CA is e-commerce. It asks Bob if he relies on the TP on the
list, and as the response is affirmative, the engine validates positively the vendor
certificate and Bob is able to perform the purchase.
5 Conclusions
Interoperability issues of interdomain PKIs are one of the key problems to be
solved in order to allow a massive deployment of PKI technology. Although
several solutions have been proposed so far, none of them has succeed in the
market due to technical, political and social constraints.
In this paper we have presented a new trust development model more flexible
than the former ones from the user point of view. The proposed model is based
on trust lists in order to resolve interoperability issues of interdomain PKIs. It
is built upon a hierarchical PKI model and extends trust using TPs. As in the
BVA model, the trust anchor is not a CA, but the TP.
The use of TPs facilitates the adoption of interdomain CAs by the users
because they are close entities which users really know and treat. TPs have
gained their reputation in a certain community by their demonstrated know-
how, activities and projects, and they are trusted in their area of expertise.
TPs are used to give recommendations, help users to interpret CAs security
policies and give them information about the PKI domains. On the other hand,
the promotion and dissemination of TPs is achieved thanks to a new certificate
extension that provides information of the entities that support its PKI domain.
Moreover, the presented architecture deals with categorized trust lists ex-
pressed in semantic language so that a more specific approach about when is
appropriate or not to accept a certificate can be surely stated.
The use of ontologies is twofold: first it permits to describe the complex
relations of the real world in a language that is interpretable by computers;
Second, it provides the base to deploy natural language interfaces for the TPs
so that user-friendly applications can be developed and consumed by anyone,
although they do not have technical skills.
Further research will be focused on defining specific ontologies for the trust
list enforcement engine to allow a highly configurable and automatic user list
management.
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